Bartlett v. Strickland

The case of Bartlett v. Strickland is quite interesting and revolves on the question of how democracy should be defined. Should electoral outcomes, for instance, reflect broad cross-sections of interests? If so, minority voices may be diluted by larger voting blocks. Or should electoral outcomes by geared toward representing specific ethnic groups and the issues that are important to them. The case itself is based on a state law in North Carolina which “declares that a state may not act in a way that impairs, on account of race or color, a citizen’s opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representative of his or her choice.” The question is then, is the law activated when (a) a minority ethnic group constitutes 50% of a voting district or (b) when that same group, comprising less than 50%, obtains a controlling majority, and can therefore elect a candidate of their choosing, with the help of another group.

If I understand the case correctly, it’s really bizarre in how paradoxical it is. On the one hand, the purpose of the law is to prevent the dilution of ethnic communities that vote consistently in blocks but are out voted by their majority counter parts. On the other hand, the law is triggered only under two conditions – just so happens that these conditions reflect a significant degree of voter “non-dilution.” If under condition (a) the group constitutes 50% of the districts population, it’s hard to imagine how any candidate could ignore the group and survive, even if the actual voting population is less than 50%. Under (b) “non-dilution” is even more obvious since the minority group obtains controlling majority, i.e., they get their candidate. So in conclusion, if my powers of discernment have not failed me, the case makes little sense, since the law comes into effect in cases where either dilution is weak, as in (a) or where it doesn’t occur at all, as in (b).